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Ron Rosenbaum wants us to be worried. His new book, How the End Begins: The 
Road to a Nuclear World War III is intended as an urgent warning that the terrifying 
dangers of nuclear weapons did not disappear when the Cold War ended two decades ago.  
There are still many thousands of nuclear weapons in the world – some 95 percent of 
them in the U.S. and Russian arsenals – and thousands of them are constantly poised for 
launch within minutes. 
Rosenbaum dives deep into the many paths by which accidents, false warnings, 
and misperceptions could lead to a “world holocaust.” And he forces the reader to 
confront the deeply troubling moral implications of relying for our security on nuclear 
threats that, if carried out, would have the inevitable result of killing tens or hundreds of 
millions of innocent people.  As Rosenbaum points out, that is a scale of slaughter 
beyond anything Hitler ever imagined.  
Unfortunately, Rosenbaum’s book is marred by mistakes, passages of pure 
speculation, and overheated rhetoric.  Worse, he exaggerates some dangers, ignores 
others, and fails to explore some of the most promising pathways to reducing the dangers 
he describes. 
The book opens with several pages of fevered speculation, centering around the 
October 2007 Israeli raid that destroyed a plutonium production reactor under 
construction in Syria.  In Rosenbaum’s account, there is “little doubt” Russia detected the 
Israeli jets taking off (actually there is enormous doubt); Russia “may well have” warned 
Iran and “could easily” have made ambiguous nuclear threats to get Israel to back off; the 
Israelis “would likely have” relayed such threats to the United States; “and suddenly both 
nuclear superpowers… were on the verge” of being drawn into a nuclear war.  This is all 
at some distance from reality.  Syria’s action in building an illicit plutonium production 
reactor, North Korea’s decision to provide it, and the Israeli move to destroy it all raised 
troubling issues and dangers – but global thermonuclear war was not among them, 
contrary to Rosenbaum (and to an anonymous British official whose quote about the 
world at that moment being on the edge of “the bloody Book of Revelation” sets off 
Rosenbaum’s chain of imagining).  It was quite possible, that night, that Syria might have 
chosen to strike back, but there was no serious chance that U.S. and Russian nuclear 
weapons would have been called into play. 
The book’s weaknesses are unfortunate, because many of the nuclear dangers 
Rosenbaum wants us to focus on are very real, and despite outstanding efforts by many 
people, there are still crucial opportunities to address them that are not being seized. 
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, it is simply insane that U.S. and 
Russian nuclear missiles remain poised for immediate launch, with military plans 
structured around launching within minutes of detecting an attack underway.  Do we 
really want to rely on decisions made in a few minutes of terror to determine the fate of a 
significant fraction of the human species, when there is no longer a global struggle to the 
death (if there ever was) to justify such fearful risks?  What if a completely convincing   2
warning, coming from both radars and satellites, turns out to be a training tape, as 
occurred in 1980?  What if the president is drunk or unbalanced at the crucial moment?  
(Rosenbaum devotes a chapter to a missile launch officer who dared to ask how he could 
confirm that the president was sane when he gave the launch order.)  I believe 
Rosenbaum is correct in deploring President Obama’s decision, in his Nuclear Posture 
Review, to renege on his campaign promise to work with Russia to take nuclear weapons 
off quick-launch alert.  The time has come for the U.S. and Russian presidents to order 
that these weapons stand down from quick-launch alert – as President George H.W. Bush 
did with a portion of the U.S. force in the early 1990s – and to direct their militaries and 
their technical experts to work out ways that each side can be confident that the other has 
taken steps that would prevent it from being able to launch its missiles for hours or days 
(and has not secretly undone those steps later).  This would be a major step in reducing 
nuclear dangers and in making nuclear weapons less relevant to the day-to-day conduct 
of international affairs. 
Next, there is much to be done to shore up the global effort to stem the spread of 
nuclear weapons, in the face of challenges from North Korea, Iran, illicit nuclear 
technology networks, global terrorist groups, and more.  The world needs stronger 
international nuclear inspections, better controls over black-market nuclear trade, 
strengthened security measures to keep nuclear weapons and materials out of terrorist 
hands, and, most importantly, steps to convince states they do not need nuclear weapons 
for their own security, including work to tamp down and ultimately resolve conflicts in 
South Asia, the Korean peninsula, the Middle East, and elsewhere. 
This global effort has been surprisingly effective: there has been no net increase 
in the number of states with nuclear weapons (nine) for the past 25 years, a period which 
included the chaos following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the A.Q. Khan black-
market network marketing nuclear weapons technology all over the world, and secret 
nuclear weapons programs in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Syria.  (North Korea 
added itself to the nuclear-armed list, but South Africa became the first state to dismantle 
a nuclear arsenal it had built.)  Indeed, there are now far more states that started nuclear 
weapons programs and verifiably gave them up than there are states with nuclear 
weapons – which means that our efforts to convince countries not to get nuclear weapons 
succeed more often than they fail, even with the few states that start down the nuclear 
weapons path. 
Of course, past performance is no guarantee of future success – and North Korea 
and Iran, in particular, pose very serious proliferation dangers.  But if we have the 
political will to undertake genuine political engagement and to offer incentives that 
convince these states that it is in their national interest to agree, it might still be possible 
to convince Iran not to build nuclear weapons and North Korea to dismantle or at least 
cap its small stockpile and avoid exporting it. 
Rosenbaum, however, is so convinced that Iran is implacably bent on getting 
nuclear weapons, and so obsessed with large-scale nuclear war as the only danger to 
worry about, that he focuses on military strikes as the only way to address the Iranian 
program, and imagines that the only realistic option is nuclear strikes – an option 
virtually no one else is seriously discussing.  (Rosenbaum seems to have missed the 
dramatic increases in the lethality of conventional weapons, which have made it possible   3
for them to carry out many missions that once required nuclear weapons.)  Rosenbaum 
touches on the dangers of war between India and Pakistan (the world’s most likely 
nuclear flashpoint) only briefly, with no proposals for risk reduction, and offers a 
similarly glancing treatment of North Korea. 
 Rosenbaum ends his book with a discussion of whether the number of nuclear 
weapons can ever realistically be reduced to zero.  Here, he seems genuinely torn – 
respecting those he interviews who are pushing for zero, while ridiculing the idea.  He 
can only imagine zero after world government (possibly nuclear-armed) has been 
established, and “a new human character” created.  But men like Henry Kissinger, 
George Schulz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry – along with two-thirds of the living 
Secretaries of State and Defense – would not be pushing for zero if that is what it would 
take.  There are many different visions of what zero might mean, some of which are an 
easier fit into the world as we know it.  One could imagine, for example, a world in 
which there were zero assembled nuclear weapons, but some states still retained a small 
number of disassembled weapons under continuous international inspection – ready to be 
reassembled should anyone try to cheat on the arrangement.  The barriers to such a world 
are large, but “an almost genetic deep change” of human nature would not be needed. 
In any case, zero is a long way off, and we need to take steps now that will reduce 
near-term dangers and begin laying the foundation for more far-reaching actions.  In the 
near term, it would make sense to focus, as Rosenbaum suggests (quoting proposals from 
Admiral Arleigh Burke, dating back to the 1950s) on getting down to small numbers of 
highly survivable nuclear weapons.  Paul Doty, among the last living participants in the 
Manhattan Project, has offered a sensible target: reducing nuclear weapons to the point 
that they no longer have enough power to destroy civilization.
1  
The events of recent years have made clear just how large the obstacles to such 
far-reaching change continue to be.  After a prolonged struggle, the United States and 
Russia managed to reach agreement on a New START treaty that reduces nuclear 
weapons only very modestly – and the Obama administration only barely managed to 
convince the Senate to ratify it.  The Nuclear Posture Review changed U.S. reliance on 
nuclear weapons only modestly, and Russia is, if anything, more reliant on them than 
ever.  The nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea have gotten more dangerous every 
year, with little discernible progress toward stopping them. Pakistan is building up its 
nuclear stockpile at a furious pace, and India may be poised to follow suit.  The U.S. 
Senate has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Conference on 
Disarmament remains unable to even begin negotiating a cutoff in production of fissile 
materials for weapons.  The International Atomic Energy Agency, the global nuclear 
watchdog, still has too little authority and funding, and too little political support to get 
much more.  The nuclear security summit in Washington in April 2010 has built 
international support for action on improving nuclear security, but states are still refusing 
to agree to effective global standards that would cost money to implement, or any form of 
independent review to confirm that they are fulfilling their security responsibilities. 
In short, far-reaching steps to reduce nuclear dangers face huge obstacles.  
Rosenbaum has called out a warning – but he would have done an even greater service 
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had he shown the way toward climbing these mountains and reaching a safer nuclear 
future. 
 